R. A. Fisher's sex ratio theory predicts that if sons and daughters cost ¢xed amounts of resources to raise and parents have ¢xed amounts to invest, then the numerical sex ratio of a panmictic population will evolve to be inversely proportional to relative cost. However, the theory assumes control by both parents. We show that allowing one parent to control the sex ratio biases it further from parity than Fisher's theory predicts. Quantitatively, the additional bias towards the cheaper sex depends only very weakly on which sex is in control. Qualitatively, however, the e¡ect is very strong: a monomorphic, mixed-brood strategy evolves only if the more expensive sex is in control. If the controlling sex is cheaper to raise, then the sex ratio is instead achieved through a polymorphism of single-sex broods. Such polymorphisms are seldom observed in nature, generating the prediction that wherever the sexes are not equally costly, sex ratio is usually either under biparental control or under uniparental control by the more expensive sex. However, such polymorphisms do occur, and some of them may be explained by our model.
INTRODUCTION
argued that parents should be selected to invest equally in sons and daughters, at least in dioecious, panmictic large populations. Fisher's analysis was purely verbal, and subsequent mathematical reconstruction of his general theory has not been entirely without controversy (Bull & Charnov 1988, p. 98) . Nevertheless, in the special circumstances where sons and daughters cost ¢xed amounts of resources to raise and parents have ¢xed amounts to invest, Fisher's theory makes the clear prediction that the numerical sex ratio (of males to females) is inversely proportional to relative cost and hence biased towards the cheaper sex (except, of course, where costs are equal). We will restrict attention to this set of assumptions throughout.
A di¤culty with any model predicting how relative cost a¡ects sex ratio is that`the relative cost of a son versus a daughter has virtually never been measured properly' (Bull & Charnov 1988, p.109) . In the absence of such estimates, the model can be tested only qualitatively, using`static' or`dynamic' tests (Bull & Charnov 1988, p. 98) . For example, some evidence supports the prediction that the cheaper sex is overproduced (Charnov 1982, p. 36) , constituting`static' testing. Observations of a return to a particular sex ratio following perturbation would constitute`dynamic' evidence (Conover & van Voorhees 1990) . Further exploration of the adaptiveness of the sex ratio requires either more reliable estimates of relative cost or a more discriminative model. The ¢rst approach has been taken by Anderson et al. (1993) and Bull & Pease (1988) . Here we adopt the second.
Although the idea that males and females each have a particular cost has been criticized by Frank (1990, p. 32) , he concedes that average relative cost of males versus females may be a useful quantity when making broad phylogenetic comparisons, and it is in this spirit that we aim to demonstrate that a further qualitative prediction is yielded under the same set of assumptions. The question we address is this. If one sex of parent controls sex allocation, i.e. if variation in sex allocation may be expressed in only one sex, then how should the identity of the controlling sex in£uence sex ratio optima?
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Fisher's equal-investment theory is most transparent in the special circumstances where sons and daughters cost ¢xed amounts of resources to raise. If the costs are c m and c f units, respectively, if gˆc m /c f is the cost of a male relative to that of a female, and if K is the total resource, then equal investment yields (1/2)K/c m males to (1/2)K/c f females, for a (male-to-female) sex ratio of 1/g. That sex ratio is inversely proportional to relative cost is Fisher's classic result. As remarked already, his argument was purely verbal: he left to others (Shaw & Mohler 1953; MacArthur 1965 ) the task of constructing a mathematical model that predicts a sex ratio of 1/g. We will recover this prediction below.
We ignore juvenile survivorship in our analysis because it is known to have no e¡ect on sex ratio under the current assumptions (Charnov 1982, p.14) . Let v be the proportion of resources invested in males in the population at large, and let u be the corresponding proportion for a potential mutant parent, assumed for the sake of argument to be female. Then mutant brood size is
population brood size is B(v); and sex ratio among o¡spring is (vK/c m )/((1 ¡ v)K/c f ). The reciprocal of which g(1 ¡ v)/v yields the expected number of matings of a male. Let ¿ D be the ¢tness of a daughter of the mutant, and ¿ S the ¢tness of a female inseminated by one of her sons. Then, in the spirit of, for example, Bulmer (1994, p. 213) or Godfray (1994, p.156) , the mutant's total ¢tness is obtained by adding the ¢tnesses of her (1 ¡ u)K /c f daughters to the ¢tnesses of the females inseminated by her uK/c m sons:
Because the multiplicative factor (1 ¡ v)K¿ S /c f does not depend on u, it has no e¡ect on the ¢tness of a potential mutant relative to that of a female in the population at large, and so we can write the (relative) ¢tness of a potential mutant as
The second term, u/v, represents a mutant parent's relative ¢tness through sons. The ¢rst term,
represents a mutant parent's relative ¢tness through daughters; it equals her relative number of daughters times the ¢tness of a daughter relative to that of a female inseminated by a son. As in Charnov (1982, p.16) , the common type's ¢tness is always 2. Fisher e¡ectively measured a mutant's ¢tness as number of daughters plus number of females inseminated by sons; in other words, he implicitly assumed that ¿ Sˆ¿Dˆ1 . Thus, using a subscript F to denote ¢tness for Fisher's analysis, we have
from equation (3). It is readily demonstrated that ¿ F (u,1/2) ¿ F (1/2, 1/2), implying that a mutant u-strategist can enter a population of 1/2-strategists only by random drift; and that ¿ F (1/2, u)4¿ F (u, u) whenever u 6 1/2, so that such mutants cannot spread, even though they are not strongly selected against. In other words, vˆ1/2 is invariably an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the sense of Maynard Smith (1982) , albeit only a weak ESS. We will refer to such a strategy, uniformly adopted by all individuals, as a monomorphic ESS to distinguish it from a polymorphic ESS, i.e. an evolutionarily stable state in which di¡erent strategies coexist. Following Charnov (1982, p.16 ), it will be useful to rewrite (4) in the form
where We note in passing that the above ESS is degenerate in the sense that a population sex ratio of 1/g can also be achieved by a neutrally stable polymorphism of mixed and single-sex broods (by analogy with MestertonGibbons, 2000, p.74) . This degeneracy arises because ¢tness is measured in units of o¡spring (i.e. ¿ Dˆ¿Sˆ1 ). If instead ¢tness is measured in units of grando¡spring (¿ Dˆ¿SˆB (u)), then the degeneracy disappears: for all g 6 1, there is a unique, monomorphic, strong ESS (at which the sex ratio is more biased toward the cheaper sex than all curves in ¢gure 2).
By assuming that ¿ Sˆ¿D , Fisher also assumed that genes controlling sex allocation have the same e¡ect, regardless of whether they are transmitted through sons or through daughters; in other words, that sex allocation is under biparental control. If a mutant geneöalthough transmitted through either sexöis expressed only in females, however, so that daughters but not sons produce mutant broods, then we can no longer assume ¿ Sˆ¿D ; rather, ¿ DˆB (u) and ¿ SˆB (v). Thus, using a subscript to denote ¢tness under female control,
from equations (1) and (3). Note that (6) Eliminating u betweenm andf , the ¢tness-trade-o¡ set (Charnov 1982 , Seger & Charnov 1988 ) has the equation
where aˆ(K/c m ) 2 fv ‡ g(1 ¡ v)g and bˆ(K /c f ) 2 . Because a depends on v, the shape of the ¢tness tradeo¡ set also depends on v; moreover, it is a convex parabola if g51, a straight line if gˆ1 and a concave parabola if g41 (¢gure 1). For reasons given by Charnov (1982, pp. 22^27) , there is a monomorphic ESS only if the ¢tness trade-o¡ set is convex, i.e. if g4 1. For gˆ1 the analysis reduces to a special case of Fisher's. For g51, the ESS is readily found either as vˆv ¤ that solves the equation @f /@mj uˆvˆ¡ f /m (Charnov 1982, p. 24) ; or as vˆv ¤ that solves the equation @¿/@uj uˆvˆ0 with @ 2 ¿/@u 2 j uˆvˆv ¤ 50 (Bulmer 1994, p.169) . Either way, we obtain the ESS allocation
which decreases from 2/3 to 1/2 to 1/3 as g increases from 0 to 1 to in¢nity, and the corresponding sex ratio is
g. Note that this ESS is`continuously stable' (Eshel 1983) or, equivalently,`convergence stable' (Christiansen 1991) , because it is readily shown that
(even for g5 1); see for example Bulmer (1994, p.170) . Convergence stability ensures that v ¤ is accessible by a non-v ¤ population. Why is equal investment (v ¤ˆ1 /2) no longer evolutionarily stable unless sons and daughters are equally costly to raise ? From equations (3) and (6), in a population of equal investors, a potential mutant's relative numbers of sons and daughters are 2u and 2(1 ¡ u), respectively, while the ¢tness of a daughter relative to that of a female inseminated by a son is
, so that investing more in sons would reduce ¢tness through daughters by exactly the same amount as it would increase ¢tness through sons. When g51, however, increased investment in sons makes a mutant's daughters relatively more valuable than females inseminated by her sons, because ¿ D /¿ Sˆ2 fg ‡ (1 ¡ g)ug/(1 ‡ g)41 if u41/2; furthermore, although the mutant has fewer daughters, because each is relatively more valuable, the associated reduction of ¢tness is exceeded by the gain in ¢t-ness through sons (mathematically, 1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ u) £ 2fu ‡ g(1¡ u)g/(1 ‡ g)52u ¡ 1 when g51 and 1/25u51). Thus, in a population of equal investors, investment in sons will increase to the level at which its gains are o¡set by the loss in ¢tness through daughters; this level, of course, is the ESS allocation v ¤ de¢ned by equation (8) above.
For g41, the ESS is polymorphic, either for the reasons given by Charnov (1982, pp. 22^27) , or else because g41 implies @ 2 ¿/@u 2 40, and hence that v ¤ is convergence stable but not`local ESS stable' (Christiansen 1991) . We note in passing that g41 is equivalent to v ¤ 41/2, by equation (8), and that even under biparental control, v ¤ 41/2 can preclude a monomorphic equilibrium if sons and daughters do not cost ¢xed amounts to raise (Frank 1987, p. 53) .
To obtain the polymorphic ESS for g41, suppose that proportion x 1 of females produces only sons while proportion x 2 produces only daughters. Then, because male and female broods are of sizes Kx 1 /c m and Kx 2 /c f , respectively, the sex ratio is (Kx 1 /c m )/(Kx 2 /c f )ˆx 1 /gx 2 ; and its reciprocal gx 2 /x 1 yields the expected number of matings per male. For a female producing only daughters, brood size is K/c f and (because females control sex allocation) each daughter's brood size is likewise K/c f , so parental ¢tness is (K/c f ) 2 . For a female producing only sons, however, brood size is K/c m and (because males have no control over sex allocation) each son's brood size has expected value Kx 1 /c m ‡ Kx 2 /c f ; parental ¢tness is therefore K /c m £ gx 2 /x 1 £ (Kx 1 /c m ‡ Kx 2 /c f )ˆ(x 1 /g ‡ x 2 )x 2 /x 1 £ (K/c f ) 2 . Thus equating ¢tnesses of alternative strategies yields (x 1 /g ‡ x 2 )x 2 /x 1ˆ1 ; solving this equation, together with x 1 ‡ x 2ˆ1 , yields the sex ratio
2 )g. Combining our two results, we ¢nd that the sex ratio under female control is (7)) under female control of sex allocation when males are cheaper to produce (g51, solid curve), when males are more expensive to produce (g41, dashed curve) and when sons and daughters are equally costly (gˆ1, dotted line). The dot indicates the point corresponding to the ESS, at which the tangent must be parallel to a diagonal of the shaded rectangle. Here gˆ1/2, and so the dot represents the point with coordinates (m ¤ , f ¤ )ˆ(1/ p 3, 2/3) corresponding to v ¤ˆ1 / p 3 (de¢ned by equation (8)). (9)) or males (dashed curve, »ˆ» de¢ned by equation (10)). The sex ratio is achieved by producing mixed or single-sex broods according to whether the more or less expensive sex is in control.
This sex ratio is plotted in ¢gure 2 as a solid curve. We note in passing that, with regard to Christiansen's remarks on`polymorphic evolutionarily attainable traits', dynamic analysis con¢rms that a mixture of v ¤ -strategists and single-sex brood producers will converge to the monomorphic ESS (de¢ned by equation (8)) or to the polymorphic ESS (de¢ned by
2 )gˆ1 ¡ x 2 ) according to whether g51 or g41; in other words, according to whether the convergence stability is or is not accompanied by local ESS stability (Christiansen 1991, p. 45) .
Suppose now that males are the controlling sex. A female parent still has K units of resource invested in her brood, but her mate now determines the distribution. So sons of a mutant u-strategist, who is now male, will produce ¿ SˆB (u) o¡spring per mating while daughters, who mate with v-strategists, will produce broods of size ¿ DˆB (v). As in equation (2), the mutant's total ¢tness is obtained by adding the ¢tnesses of his daughters to the ¢tnesses of the females inseminated by his sons:
after simpli¢cation. Because the multiplicative factor (1 ¡ v)K¿ D /c f does not depend on u, we can write the (relative) ¢tness of a potential mutant under male control as ¿ (u, v, g) ² ¿ (1 ¡ u, 1 ¡ v, 1/g): a male u-strategist in a population of male v-strategists when the relative cost is g is strategically equivalent to a female (1 ¡ u)-strategist in a population of female (1 ¡ v)-strategists when the relative cost is 1/g. Thus the male/female sex ratio when relative cost is g equals the female/male sex ratio when relative cost is 1/g; that is, under male control, the sex ratio is
This sex ratio is plotted in ¢gure 2 as a dashed curve. We note in passing that the above argument for control by males could not apply to haploid males of haplodiploid species, who have no ¢tness through sons; however, it is also unnecessary because females are in control and our earlier argument continues to apply (see the discussion by Charnov (1982, p.13) ).
Comparing » with » in ¢gure 2, we note that a polymorphic sex ratio is slightly less biased toward the cheaper sex than a monomorphic sex ratio, regardless of which sex is more expensive or which sex of parent is in control, and that a monomorphic ESS implies that the more expensive sex is in control, whereas a polymorphic ESS implies that the cheaper sex is in control. In either case the sex ratio reveals greater bias toward the cheaper sex than under biparental control (Fisher's classic result, shown in ¢gure 2 as a dotted curve).
DISCUSSION
We have used an idealized model to elucidate the e¡ect of sexually di¡erential production costs on sex ratio optima under uniparental control of sex allocation when the controlling parent belongs to either the cheaper or the more expensive sex. Our predictions are always more biased toward the cheaper sex than those of Fisher (1930) . Quantitatively, the resultant ESS is virtually independent of which parent is in control (note the proximity of the dashed and solid curves in ¢gure 2). Qualitatively, however, the dependence is strong: the ESS is monomorphic when the more expensive sex is in control and polymorphic when the less expensive sex is in control. Thus virtually the same outcome in terms of population trait can be achieved by very di¡erent individual behaviour (Bull & Charnov 1988; Godfray 1994, p. 205 ; see also Orzack 2002) . Our model di¡ers from those of Bull and Charnov, and Godfray, however, in that polymorphisms are selected for, rather than occurring due to selective neutrality.
Because polymorphisms are seldom observed in nature, these results lead to the prediction that wherever the sexes are not equally costly, sex ratio is usually either under biparental control or under uniparental control by the more expensive sex. Polymorphisms do occur, however, and we discuss them below in the context of our results. Our model assumes that o¡spring have ¢xed costs of production for parents but that the costs of son and daughter production may di¡er. Although, as already noted, the assumption of particular costs can be criticized (Frank 1990) , it can also serve as a useful simpli¢cation. We do not discuss this issue further, other than to note that sexually di¡erential production costs have been demonstrated in sexually dimorphic vertebrates (CluttonBrock 1991, p. 215; Anderson et al. 1993 ; but see Smiseth & Lorentsen 1995) .
We have assumed that parents have adaptive control of the sex ratio by explicitly assuming that one sex of parent controls sex allocation, and that the other does not (whereas Fisher (1930) assumed control by both parents). Maternal control of the sex ratio is known in many invertebrates with haplodiploid sex determination systems, such as Hymenoptera. (In eusocial species in which workers control the colony sex ratio, polymorphisms are predicted and observed when queen mating frequency varies (Boomsma & Grafen 1991; Bourke & Franks 1995) .) Many species of parasitoid Hymenoptera have local (nonpanmictic) mating systems; thus our model does not apply. Although sex ratio polymorphisms under local mating are predicted by some models (van Tienderen & de Jong 1986; Gree¡ 1996) , parasitoid broods are generally monomorphic (mixed sex) and female biased (e.g. Hardy 1992 Hardy , 1994 . Polymorphic sex ratios (single sex broods) are, however, observed in some parasitoids (e.g. Ode & Hunter 2002) . Of particular interest in the context of our model are species in the parasitoid genus Achrysocharoides (Hymenoptera: Eulophidae) in which mothers produce small broods containing either only males or only females, a phenomenon that has hitherto lacked an adaptive explanation (West et al. 1999) . Mating systems and the costs of producing male and female o¡spring are not well known in these species. It has been assumed that they are panmictic and that sons are per capita more expensive than daughters; male ¢tness may decline more steeply than female ¢tness as the number of siblings sharing a ¢xed resource increases (West et al. 1999) . Numbers of male and female broods are generally similar, with the overall sex ratio of individuals biased towards femalesöprobably the cheaper sex (West et al. 1999) . Achrysocharoides species may thus conform to the major assumptions of our model and support its predictions. However, there are a number of other factors that may a¡ect sex ratio optima in these species (West et al. 1999) and these require further investigation.
In vertebrates with chromosomal sex determination mechanisms (e.g. birds and mammals), parental control of sex ratio is the subject of ongoing debate, as is the issue of which sex potentially has greater control (e.g. Krackow, 1995 Krackow, , 1999 Hardy, 1997; Oddie, 1998) . While birds and mammals are more likely than broodproducing invertebrates to conform to the assumption of panmixis, other assumptions of our model may frequently be violated (for example, by sexually di¡erential returns from parental investment (Frank 1990; Hewison & Gaillard 1999) ), making tests of these models problematical. Polymorphic sex ratios are not normally observed among bird and mammal broods (e.g. James 1975; Newton & Marquiss 1979; Hardy 1997 ) and exceptions may be explained by factors such as siblicide (Hofer & East 1997 ) and non-Fisherian investment returns (Okanen 1981) . In the cooperatively breeding parrot Eclectus roratus most broods containing more than one o¡spring are single sex. In this species the mother appears to have a high degree of control of o¡spring sex at fertilization, but may further modify brood sex ratio post-hatching by infanticide and selective resource allocation (Heinsohn et al. (1997) . The overall juvenile sex ratio is unbiased, but production costs of sons and daughters are unknown (males are around 6% heavier than females (S. Legge and R. Heinsohn, personal communication) but this may not accurately re£ect energetic expenditure by parents; see, for example, Richter 1983). Heinsohn et al. (1997) were unable to provide an adaptive explanation for the Eclectus roratus sex ratio data they explored; our model provides a candidate.
Although sex ratio polymorphisms have been predicted by theories making a number of non-Fisherian assumptions (Okanen 1981; Seger & Charnov 1988; van Tienderen & de Jong 1986; Boomsma & Grafen 1991; Gree¡ 1996) , our model is the ¢rst to predict selection for a sex ratio polymorphism under the Fisherian conditions of panmixis and sexually non-di¡erential ¢tness returns for parental investment. Van Tienderen & de Jong (1986) argued that phenotypic models may fail to detect polymorphisms that could be revealed by genetic models, and that polymorphisms are unlikely under panmixis. Our results are at variance with both conclusions, because our model is phenotypic and detects a polymorphic ESS under panmixis. The predictions of our new model are signi¢-cantly di¡erent from those of Fisher's model only in a qualitative sense, yet they provide candidate explanations for observed polymorphisms that previously had none.
